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FEDERAL TAX RESTRICTIONS ON CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATION POLITICAL ACTIVITY: A
PENALTY REFORM PROPOSAL
Zack D. Mason*
The federal tax law imposes severe restraints on the campaigning and lobbying
activities of charitable organizations. Unfortunately, the prohibitions against
certain political activities and the sanctions for violations of these restrictions are
overly complex and ambiguous. As a result, the regulations force charitable
organizations to act without a clear picture of the boundary between acceptable
and unacceptable political activity and of the penalty to be imposed if they cross
into the latter.' The job of restricting the political freedom of hundreds of
thousands of charitable organizations2 should not be left to such inexact and
inefficient sanctions.
This article proposes a sanction structure which can significantly improve
compliance with and uniform enforcement of political activity restrictions of
charitable organizations. As a starting point for understanding the sanction
proposal, Part I of the article reviews the current political activity sanctions
imposed on charitable organizations. Part II discusses the weaknesses of the
current sanctions and the failure of the sanctions to meet Congressional objectives.
Part III proposes a new sanction structure and explains how the proposal will
more effectively achieve Congressional objectives. The Appendix shows the spe-
cific legislative changes suggested by the article.
I. CURRENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY SANCTIONS
A. Types of Charitable Organizations
Congress defines the most common and well known tax exempt entities, the
section 501(c)(3) "charitable organizations," ' 3 as follows:
(B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1979; M.B.A., 1983; J.D., 1983; LL.M. (Taxation),
Southern Methodist University, 1987). The author is a Certified Public Accountant, a member of the
Texas Bar and an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Texas at San Antonio.
Copyright, 1990, Zack D. Mason.
1. The current sanctions may cause at least 3 undesirable results. (1) The charitable organizations
may be unaware of the potentially severe tax consequences of their actions because they lack the
resources to find, interpret and apply the sanction statutes; (2) The charitable organizations may
ignore the restrictions because the organizations perceive a decrease in audit risk associated with
complex statutes; and (3) Charitable organizations may restrict their political activity for fear of
unintentionally crossing over an unclear boundary.
2. See Cumulative List of Organizations, IRS Publication No. 78 (1988). As of June 30, 1986,
the IRS exempt organization / business master files indicated a total of 371,395 section 501(c)(3)
organizations. The figure includes about 37,000 private foundations. The figure does not include
religious organizations which did not apply for tax exempt status. Lobbying and Political Activities
By Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Hearings] at 51.
3. The term "charitable organization" is commonly used by practitioners and commentators
to mean organizations described in section 501(c)(3). The term will be so used in this article as well.
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Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Organizations that choose to fall under the section 501(c)(3) definition can
take advantage of major tax benefits unavailable to other types of organizations. 4
The primary tax benefits available to charitable organizations are:
1) exemption from tax on income (except for unrelated business taxable income)';
2) exemption from FUTA tax"; and,
3) the ability to receive tax deductible contributions.7
Exempt organizations not described in section 501(c)(3) are exempt from tax on
their income,' but they cannot claim the other benefits available to charitable
organizations. Only charitable organizations are exempt from the FUTA tax and,
in general, only charitable organizations can receive tax deductible contributions. 9
In exchange for these benefits, however, charitable organizations, especially
those that desire to engage in political activity in order to meet their charitable
objectives, suffer burdens not known to other organizations. All charitable
organizations are to some degree limited in their political activities, no matter
how much those activities benefit society or contribute to the charitable goals of
the organization,' 0 but not all types of charitable organizations are restricted in
exactly the same manner or to the same degree. Distinguishing among the various
types of charitable organizations is important, therefore, for determining the
extent of political involvement an organization can reach before the organization
is subject to the imposition of sanctions (i.e., excise taxes, the loss of exempt
status, or both).
For purposes of determining political activity limitations, charitable organi-
zations fall into one of three possible categories: private foundations, electing
public charities and non-electing public charities. Generally speaking, a private
foundation is any charitable organization that does not receive broad-based public
4. Tax-exempt organizations include section 527 political organizations and twenty-five categories
of section 501(c) organizations.
5. I.R.C. § 501(a)-(b)(1991).
6. I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1991).
7. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii), 2522(a)(2) and 2522(b)(2) (1991).
8. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1991).
9. Section 501(c)(19) veteran's organizations can receive tax deductible contributions. For a
discussion of the constitutional issues involved in this area, see Regan v. Taxation With Representation,
461 U.S. 540 (1983) in which the Supreme Court held that it is constitutional to permit veteran's
organizations (which can receive tax deductible contributions) to engage in lobbying which would
cause a loss of exempt status if engaged in by a section 501(c)(3) organization.
10. Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185; Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir.
1955); Dulles, Exr. v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert denied, 364 U.s. 834 (1960);
Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876 (2nd. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, (1989).
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support." A public charity is any charitable organization which is not a private
foundation.' 2 Public charities can make an election which allows the charitable
organization's lobbying activity to be limited by an objective standard measured
in dollars expended on lobbying activity. 3 Such public charities are referred to
in this article as "electing public charities." The lobbying activity of all other
public charities, "non-electing public charities," is limited by the subjective "no
substantial part" lobbying standard.' 4 Churches, organizations affiliated with
churches, and private foundations cannot elect to use the objective standard."
B. Current Restrictions on Political Activity
Private foundations, electing public charities and non-electing public charities
are all subject to severe restrictions on their campaigning and lobbying activities.
Congress, however, has not devised a single political activity rule applicable to
all charitable organizations. Neither has Congress devised a single rule which
explains the restricted political activity of any one of the categories of charitable
organizations. Instead, Congress has created multiple political activity rules
(including four different excise taxes 6 and one campaign tax 7) applicable to
charitable organizations. Some of the rules apply only to one type of charitable
organization; others impact more than one type of charitable organization. The
effect of the current law is to require every charitable organization to look to
several different statutory definitions of political behavior deemed undesirable by
Congress, each with different penalties, in order to determine the consequences
of their political activity.
1. Campaigning Limitations
Under current law, charitable organizations must be extremely cautious when
they become involved in any activity resembling political campaigning." Any
amount of campaigning, no matter how small, may cause loss of exempt status
under section 501(c)(3). Campaigning may also subject the charitable organization
to the section 527(0 campaign tax, the section 4945 excise tax (if the organization
is a private foundation) and the section 4955 excise tax. These uncoordinated
statutes, each with its own unique definitions and penalties, make becoming
involved in campaigning a minefield for charitable organizations.
Under section 501(c)(3), a charitable organization must not "participate in,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
11. I.R.C. § 509(a) (1991). A typical private foundation is funded by private sources, controlled
by a small group of individuals and engaged in supporting a wide variety of charitable causes.
12. I.R.C. § 509(a) (1991).
13. I.R.C. § 501(h)(1) (1991).
14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).
15. I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(3), (4) and (5) and 170(b)(l)(A)(i) (1991).
16. I.R.C. §§ 4911, 4912, 4945 and 4955 (1991).
17. I.R.C. § 527(f) (1991).
18. See, e.g., Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 1768 (1989) (the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that the Bar
association's ratings of candidates for elective judicial office is participation in a political campaign
even where the evaluation of the candidates was on a nonpartisan basis).
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office." An organization engaging in such campaigning loses its exempt status.
Unfortunately, the section 501(c)(3) regulations do little to clarify the statutory
terminology. The only clarification given in the regulations is that for purposes
of section 501(c)(3), a candidate for public office is "an individual who offers
himself, or is proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective public office,
whether such office be national, State, or local."" 9 The regulations leave un-
touched several difficult problems. For example, the regulations fail to discuss
at what point a person actually becomes a candidate, what constitutes participation
or intervention in political campaigns and under what circumstances participation
in a political campaign by a member of an organization is attributable to the
organization itself."
Even if activities are acceptable under 501(c)(3), charitable organizations may
still be penalized under 527(0. The section 527(f) campaign tax applies to all
501(c)(3) organizations which are exempt from tax under 501(a) and which expend
any amount for an "exempt function."'" The tax is imposed at the highest
corporate rate on the lesser of net investment income of the organization or the
amount expended during the year for an exempt function.? For purposes of
section 527(0, an "exempt function" is:
the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination,
election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public
office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-
Presidential electors, whether or not such individuals or electors are selected,
nominated, elected, or appointed.Y
The definition of exempt function is generally broader than the description
of political campaigning found in section 501(c)(3) and the associated regulation.
Exempt function includes participating not only in the campaign of a "candidate
for public office," (an elected official) but also in the "campaign" of a person
who may be selected, nominated or appointed (e.g., cabinet members, heads of
agencies, federal judges).2 Exempt function also includes influencing or attempt-
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
20. Because the regulations have remained so unilluminating, the more difficult questions
surrounding the interpretation of the section 501(c)(3) campaigning restrictions often have remained
unanswered. Occasionally, the Treasury or the courts are forced to grapple with such issues. See
Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (distinction between neutral voter education and political activity);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39441 (November 7, 1985) (endorsing a candidate for public office constitutes
intervention in a political campaign, even if endorsement is asserted to have been based on neutral
assessments of candidates professional, intellectual, or ethical qualifications); Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-
2 C.B. 151 (organization that asked candidates to sign a code of fair campaign practices, and released
the names of candidates who signed and refused to sign, was intervening in a political campaign);
Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972) (religious
organization was denied exemption under 501(c)(3) because, while it did not formally endorse
candidates, it urged the public through publications and broadcasts to support some candidates and
oppose others), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d
876 (2nd Cir. 1988) (Bar association's ratings of candidates for elective judicial office was prohibited
campaigning activity), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989). For a discussion of the problems of political
activity by "educational" organizations, see Sabbath, Tax Exempt Political Educational Organizations:
Is the Exemption Being Abused, 41 TAX LAW. 847 (1988).
21. I.R.C. § 527(f(1) (1991).
22. Id.
23. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (1991).
24. See I.R.S. Ann. 88-114, 1988-37 I.R.B. 26.
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ing to influence the party nomination of an individual to run for an elective
office. Loss of exempt status under section 501(c)(3) comes only if the organization
participates or intervenes in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate for
public office.Y Arguably, a candidate for public office would not be a candidate
until after the party nomination.2 A charitable organization which participated
in the nomination process, therefore, could be taxed under section 527(0, but
would not lose its exempt status under section 501(c)(3).
In some senses, however, the section 527(0 tax is less restrictive than the
section 501(c)(3) campaigning limitations. First, the section 527(f) tax applies only
to an expenditure. Dollars (or something else of value) must change hands before
the tax can be applied.27 Participation by unpaid volunteers of a charitable
organization in the campaign of a candidate for public office would not cause a
section 527(0 tax, but would cause a loss of exempt status under section 501(c)(3).
Second, the section 527(0 tax applies only to the extent that a charitable
organization has net investment income.2 If the charitable organization maintains
a separate segregated fund for exempt function expenditures, the fund is treated
as a separate organization." The tax applies only to the extent that the separate
segregated fund has net investment income. Thus a charitable organization with
no investment income can engage in unlimited political activity, including the
making of exempt function expenditures, without encountering a section 527(0
tax.
Because the section 527(0 definition of exempt function does not match the
description of political campaigning in section 501(c)(3), it is possible for a
charitable organization to engage in campaigning activity which would cause the
organization to lose its exempt status, but would not cause a tax under section
527(0. The reverse could also happen. An organization could be subject to the
section 527(f) campaign tax without losing its exempt status. Although sections
501(c)(3) and 527(0 limit somewhat similar, and at times overlapping, activities,
the tax results of the two sections can vary greatly.
25. The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position in G.C.M. 39811 (February 9, 1990)
that a tax-exempt foundation intervened in a political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
candidates for public office when it urged its members to seek election as Republican or Democratic
precinct committeemen. The Service stated that to require the identification of particular candidates
before a loss of exemption under section 501(c)(3) would undermine the clear prohibition against
"any" participation contained in the regulations.
26. See Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876, 880 (2nd Cir. 1988); ("One need
not be a party nominee to be a candidate for public office .... 'A campaign for a public office in
a public election merely and simply means running for office, or candidacy for office, as the word
is used in common parlance and as it is understood by the man in the street."' (citing Norris v.
United States, 86 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 300 U.S. 564 (1937)), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989)).
27. An expenditure for purposes of section 527 is defined in section 271(b)(3). Expenditure
includes a "payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of money, or anything of value,
and includes a contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure, whether or not legally
enforceable." I.R.C. § 271(b)(3) (1991).
28. Net investment income is defined in section 527(0(2) as "the excess of (A) the gross amount
of income from interest, dividends, rents, and royalties, plus the excess (if any) of gains from the
sale or exchange of assets over the losses from the sale or exchange of assets, over (B) the deductions
allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the income referred to
in paragraph (A)." I.R.C. § 527(0(2) (1991).
29. I.R.C. § 527(f)(3) (1991).
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The section 4945 excise tax applies to private foundations which make any
campaigning or lobbying expenditures. The tax is ten percent of the campaigning
or lobbying expenditure, but increases to 100% if the expenditure is not corrected
within the taxable period involved.3 The description of campaigning activity
subject to the excise tax is any expenditure "influenc[ing] the outcome of any
specific public election, or to carry on, directly or indirectly, any voter registration
drive." '32 Certain nonpartisan activities carried on in several states are not con-
sidered taxable expenditures.33
As between 501(c) and 527(f), there is an inconsistency between definitions
of political activity. The section 4945 definition of campaigning activity is different
than both the section 501(c)(3) and the section 527(0 definitions. The section
4945 definition limits the undesirable activity to an expenditure. This restriction
is similar to the section 527(0 expenditure requirement, but the 4945 expenditure
must "influence the outcome of a public election." Thus an expenditure by a
charitable organization made in order to influence a judicial appointment, for
example, would not be subject to the section 4945 tax on campaigning or to the
loss of exempt status under section 501(c)(3), but would be subject to the section
527(0 tax.
The section 4955 excise tax for campaigning is applicable to all charitable
organizations. The excise tax is 10% of the exempt organization's "political
expenditure" for the year, 5 but is increased to 100% of the political expenditure
if the expenditure is not corrected during the taxable year. 36 Management of the
charitable organization may also be subject to an excise tax of 2.5% of the
political expenditure (increased to 50% if the expenditure is not corrected 7) if
the management knowingly agrees to the expenditure.3 8 If the section 4955 excise
tax is imposed on a private foundation for a political expenditure, the section
4945 excise tax is not imposed on the private foundation for that expenditure. 9
The definition of "political expenditure" under section 4955 closely corre-
sponds to the description of campaign activity under section 501(c)(3). Under
section 4955, a political expenditure is "any amount paid or incurred by a section
501(c)(3) organization in any participation in, or intervention in (including the
publication or distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." ' * The primary difference
between the application of the sanctions under section 501(c)(3) and under section
4955 is that the section 4955 tax requires an amount to be paid or incurred,
30. I.R.C. § 4945(a)(1) (1991).
31. I.R.C. § 4945(b)(1) (1991).
32. I.R.C. § 4945(d)(2) (1991).
33. I.R.C. § 4945(0 (1991).
34. Ann. 88-114, 1988-37 I.R.B. 26; G.C.M. 39694 (Jan. 22, 1988); Notice 88-76, 1988-2 C.B.
392.
35. I.R.C. § 4955(a)(1) (1991).
36. I.R.C. § 4955(bXl) (1991).
37. I.R.C. § 4955(bX2) (1991).
38. I.R.C. § 4955(a)(2) (1991. Additionally, a manager may be imposed a penalty equal to the
amount of the tax if the manager's actions were not due to reasonable cause and either (I) the
manager has been liable for the tax before, or (2) the action was willful and flagrant. I.R.C. § 6684
(1991).
39. I.R.C. § 4955(e) (1991).
40. I.R.C. § 4955(d)(1) (1991).
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whereas the section 501(c)(3) loss of exempt status is applicable whenever there
is participation or intervention in a political campaign, whether or not there is
an expenditure. Thus a loss of exempt status is possible without a section 4955
tax (i.e., when there is no expenditure); however, political campaigning requiring
the imposition of the section 4955 tax should require the loss of exempt status
under section 501(c)(3).
Nevertheless, IRS has recognized that in certain cases of "de minimis"
campaign activity, the section 501(c)(3) sanction will not be applied.4 ' Although
Congress expressly stated that the excise tax should not be so utilized 4 2 the
section 4955 excise tax on campaigning may be used by the IRS as an alternative
to the application of the heavier penalty of loss of exempt status. IRS could use
the section 527(f) tax in the same manner, as a lighter penalty for campaigning
activity thought too minor by the IRS to justify loss of exempt status. The IRS
has not made a clear statement of when either the section 4955 or the section
527(f) tax will be used as a substitute for the loss of exempt status sanction
apparently required by section 501(c)(3).
2. Lobbying Limitations on Both Non-electing Public Charities and Private
Foundations: The "Substantial Part" Limitation on Lobbying Activities.
Non-electing public charities and private foundations can be involved in
lobbying, but only if such lobbying activity is not "substantial. ' '43 If a charitable
organization does cross over the "substantial" lobbying line, it will lose its
exempt status under section 501(c)(3) and be subject to the section 4912 excise
tax. Additional lobbying limitations which affect private foundations are covered
in the next section of this article.
The treasury and the courts have been reluctant to use any objective criteria
in defining the limits of "substantial."" Non-electing public charities and private
foundations, therefore, have little guidance for planning the extent of their
lobbying activities.45 For purposes of section 501(c)(3), loss of exempt status
41. G.C.M. 39414 (September 25, 1985); G.C.M. 34267 (February 20, 1970) ("[Tihe Service has
long accorded an exclusively educational or religious status to a fairly large number of organizations
that could likewise be charged with having engaged in something more than an insignificant amount
of political activity from time to time."); G.C.M. 34071 (March I1, 1969).
42. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1623-4 (1987).
43. Id. at 1624-5.
44. The Courts have had difficulty determining the criteria for determining "substantial." In
Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955), the Sixth Circuit held that lobbying
activities constituting less than five percent of an organization's time and effort were not substantial.
In Haswell v. U.S., 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975), the
Court of Claims held that the fact that an organization spent between 16.6 percent and 20.5 percent
of its budget on lobbying provided a strong indication of substantiality. The Tenth Circuit in Christian
Echoes Nat Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 864 (1973), specifically rejected the use of a percentage test because such a test "obscures the
complexity of balancing the organization's activities in relation to its objectives and circumstances."
See also League of Women Voters of United States v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960); Robert's Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948 (8th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 85; and Kuper v.
Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
45. H.R. REP. No. 1210, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 7-17 (1976), drafted as an explanation to the
changes in the House bill leading to the enactment of sections 501(h) and 4911, states:
The language of the lobbying provision was first enacted in 1934. Since that time neither
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occurs when a substantial part of the activities of the organization is "carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation... ." Regulation
1.501(c)(3)-(c)(3)(ii) states that an organization is regarded as influencing legis-
lation if the organization either "contacts, or urges the public to contact, members
of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing
legislation or advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation." If, however,
the organization advocates, as an insubstantial part of its activities, the adoption
or rejection of legislation, exempt status remains intact. The organization can
lose its exempt status if the organization's main objective or objectives may be
attained only by legislation or a defeat of legislation and the organization
advocates, or campaigns for, the attainment of such objective. The regulations
imply that an organization with such an agenda has de facto a substantial part
of its activities as attempting to influence legislation. 4 The regulation describes
"legislation" broadly as including "action by the Congress, by any State legis-
lature, by any local council or similar governing body, or by the public in a
referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment, or similar procedure. '47
The section 4912 excise tax applies to charitable organizations which have
lost their section 501(c)(3) status by reason of making lobbing expenditures."
The tax does not apply to an electing public charity,49 a church or certain church-
related organizations," or a private foundation". The tax is five percent of the
lobbying expenditure.5 2 Any organization management willfully making an expen-
diture which he knows will likely result in the organization exceeding the "sub-
stantial" lobbying standard will also be subject to an excise tax on five percent
of the lobbying expenditures. 3
For purposes of section 4912, a lobbying expenditure is "any amount paid
or incurred by the organization in carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempt-
ing to influence legislation. ' 4 The definition differs from the description of
lobbying under section 501(c)(3) in that the section 4912 definition requires an
expenditure. The expenditure must be the cause of the loss of exempt status in
order for the section 4912 tax to apply.
The Treasury has not issued regulations under section 4912. Therefore,
organizations have a difficult time assessing their risks under the statute. An
organization could reasonably assume that the courts would apply the definition
of lobbying as found under section 501(c)(3) regulations when interpreting the
Treasury regulations nor court decisions have given enough detailed meaning to the
statutory language to permit most charitable organizations to know approximately where
the limits are between what is permitted by the statute and what is forbidden by it.
This vagueness is, in large part, a function of the uncertainty in the meaning of the
terms "substantial part" and "activities."
Id at 8. The statement is equally true today.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv) (as amended in 1990).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
48. I.R.C. § 4912(a) (1991).
49. I.R.C. § 4912(c)(2XA) (1991).
50. The section 4912 tax does not apply to a section 501(h)(5) disqualified organization. I.R.C.
§ 4912(c)(2)(B) (1991).
51. I.R.C. § 4912(c)(2XC) (1991).
52. I.R.C. § 4912(a) (1991).
53. I.R.C. § 4912(b) (1991).
54. I.R.C. § 4912(d)(1) (1991).
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section 4912 tax. Such an interpretation would appear likely because engaging
in section 501(c)(3) lobbying is a prerequisite to the application of the section
4912 excise tax. Additionally, the section 4912 description of lobbying exactly
mimics the lobbying language of section 501(c)(3). The organization, therefore,
must assume the broad interpretation of lobbying found in the section 501(c)(3)
regulations is narrowed under section 4912 only to the extent that the appli-
cation of the section 4912 excise tax requires an expenditure.
3. Other Lobbying Limitations on Private Foundations
A private foundation, like any charitable organization, cannot be involved
in section 501(c)(3) campaigning or substantial lobbying. The private founda-
tion, however, is also subject to the section 4945 excise tax on campaigning
and on any lobbying, not just substantial lobbying." Any expenditure on
campaigning or lobbying is subject to the 10% excise tax to the organization
(100% if the expenditure is not corrected within the taxable period involved).5 6
Willful expenditures by management could result in excise taxes of 2.5% of
the expenditures. 7 The excise tax on management increases to 50% of the
expenditure if the expenditure is not corrected within the taxable period.58
Section 4945 identifies two types of political expenditures. The first type
of taxable expenditure is a campaigning expenditure. 9 The second type of
taxable expenditure is a lobbying expenditure. 60 Section 4945(e) breaks lobbying
into two categories. The first type of lobbying is defined as:
any attempt to influence legislation through communication with any member
or employee of a legislative body, or with any other government official or
employee who may participate in the formulation of the legislation (except
technical advice or assistance provided to a governmental body or to a
committee or other subdivision thereof in response to a written request by
such body or subdivision, as the case may be).6 '
Although section 4945 does not label this category, for ease of discussion the
above category will be referred to in this article as section 4945 direct lobbying.
The second type of lobbying, referred to in this article as section 4945 grass
roots lobbying, is defined as "any attempt to influence any legislation through
an attempt to affect the opinion of the general public or any segment thereof." 62
Section 4945(e) specifically excludes from the section 4945 definitions two
exceptions: (1) making available the results of "nonpartisan analysis," and (2)
"an appearance before, or communication to, any legislative body with respect
to a possible decision of such body, which might affect the existence of the
private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deduc-
tion of contributions to such foundation." 63 The "nonpartisan analysis" ex-
55. I.R.C. § 4945(b) (1991).
56. I.R.C. § 4945(b) (1991).
57. I.R.C. § 4945(a)(2) (1991).
58. I.R.C. § 4945(b)(2) (1991).
59. I.R.C. § 4945(d)(2) (1991).
60. I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1) (1991).
61. I.R.C. § 4945(e)(2) (1991).
62. I.R.C. § 4945(e)(1) (1991).
63. I.R.C. § 4945(e) (1991).
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ception to lobbying activity is also found in the section 501(c)(3) regulations6
and would apply to section 501(c)(3) lobbying and probably to section 4912
lobbying as well. The second exception, the "appearance" exception, is not
found in the section 4945 regulation. The regulations do, however, provide
that discussions of broad social, economic and similar problems are not lobbing
activities .65
Section 4945 regulations define "legislation" exactly as stated in the section
501(c)(3) regulations:
For purposes of this section, the term "legislation" includes action by the
Congress, by any State legislature, by any local council, or similar governing
body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment,
or similar procedure."
The section 4945 regulations go much farther, however, in explaining the
boundaries of lobbying activity. First, the section 4945 regulations state that
legislation does not include action by executive, judicial or administrative
bodies such as school boards, housing authorities and sewer and water dis-
tricts.6 7 The section 501(c)(3) regulations make no such statement. Second, the
section 4945 regulations state that "action" includes the introduction, enact-
ment, defeat or repeal of legislation." Again, the section 501(c)(3) regulations
are silent. The inconsistencies between the section 4945 regulations and the
section 501(c)(3) regulations magnify the confusion already present in the
statutory language differences.
4. Lobbying Limitations on Electing Public Charities
A charitable organization that is not a church or a private foundation can
elect under 501(h) to have lobbying limitations determined by a specific
expenditure formula rather than by the "substantial" test of non-electing
charitable organizations. 9 IRS figures indicate that less than one percent of
all charitable organizations make the 501(h) election.70 The 501(h) election does
not affect the complete prohibition of campaigning by charitable organiza-
tions?' The specific expenditure formula requires the payment of an excise tax
of 25% on the "excess lobbying expenditures" of the organization.7 2 The excess
lobbying expenditure is the greater of:
(1) the amount by which the lobbying expenditures made by the organization
during the taxable year exceed the lobbying nontaxable amount for such
organization for such taxable year, or
(2) the amount by which the grass roots expenditures made by the organization
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.105(c)(3)-i(c)(3)(iv) (as amended in 1990).
65. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(d)(4) (as amended in 1990).
66. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1990).
67. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1990).
68. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1990).
69. I.R.C. § 501(h)(l) (1991). For a discussion of the factors which charitable organizations
should consider in deciding whether to make the section 501(h) election, see generally James H. Nix,
Limitations on the Lobbying of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations - A Choice for the Public Charities,
81 W. VA. L. REv. 407 (1979).
70. A. Mark Christopher, Political Activities Become More Risky for Tax Erempts Due to RA
'87, 68 J. TAX'N 136, 138 (March 1988).
71. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).
72. I.R.C. § 4911(a)(1) (1991).
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during the taxable year exceed the grass roots nontaxable amount for such
organization for such taxable year. 3
The lobbying nontaxable amount for any organization for any taxable year is
the lesser of $1,000,000 or the amount determined under the following table:
EXEMPT PURPOSE EXPENDITURES LOBBYING NONTAXABLE AMOUNT
Not over 500,000 20% of the EPE.
500,000 to 1,000,000 100,000 + 1507o of EPE over 500,000.
1,000,000 to 1,500,000 175,000 + 10% of EPE over 1,000,000.
Over 1,5000,000 225,000 + 5% of EPE over 1,500,000.7
4
The "grass roots nontaxable amount" for any organization for any taxable
year is 25% of the lobbying nontaxable amount for such organization for such
taxable year. 7
Exempt purpose expenditures are the total amount paid to accomplish the
organization's exempt (religious, charitable, educational, etc.) purposes. The
amount includes amounts paid or incurred for the purpose of influencing
legislation. 76
If a charitable organization "normally" has lobbying expenditures that
exceed 150% of the lobbying nontaxable amounts, the organization loses its
exempt status.77 Although the code does not define the term "normally," IRS
generally revokes exempt status where the organization has lobbying expendi-
tures averaging in excess of the 150%o limit during four consecutive years. 78
Lobbying expenditures are defined for purposes of both section 501(h)
and section 4911 as "expenditures for the purposes of influencing legislation.
' 79
Influencing legislation is in turn defined as:
(A) any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the
opinions of the general public or any segment thereof, and
(B) any attempt to influence any legislation through communication with any
member or employee of a legislative body, or with any government official or
employee who may participate in the formulation of the legislation.80
Grass roots expenditures are defined for purposes of both section 501(h) and
section 4911 as "any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt
to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof.81
Section 4911(e)(2) defines legislation as in the section 501(c)(3) and section
4945 regulations. Section 4911(d)(3) defines "action" as "limited to the intro-
duction, amendment, enactment, defeat, or repeal of Acts, bills, resolutions,
or similar items." The section 4911(e)(3) definition of action, however, al-
though similar to the definition under the section 501(c)(3) and section 4945
73. I.R.C. § 4911(b) (1991).
74. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) (1991).
75. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(4) (1991).
76. I.R.C. § 4911(e)(l)(B)(ii) (19191).
77. I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)(A) (1991).
78. See S. REP. No. 938 (PART 2), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, n.3 (1976).
79. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(1) (1991).
80. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1) (1991).
81. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1)(A) (1991).
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regulations, has two significant differences. First, this definition is intentionally
limiting; only those items listed are included in the definition. The definition
of action under the section 501(c)(3) and section 4945 regulations is less
restricting by using the word "includes" in the definition. Second, section
4911(d)(3) specifically lists "amendment" as an action; the section 501(c)(3)
and the section 4945 regulations do not specifically list "amendment" of
legislation as an action. The section 501(c)(3) regulations do not even define
"action" of a legislative body. "Amendment" might by interpreted by courts
to be included in the "similar procedure" language of the section 501(c)(3)
and section 4945 definition of "legislation." The regulations, however, are
obviously inconsistent in major respects. 2 Interpretation of the statutes and
the regulations under such circumstances is necessarily more complex and more
difficult than if a consistent definition of lobbying applied.83
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT STRUCTURE
As stated in the introduction to this article, the current scheme for
restricting the political activity of exempt organizations fails to guide charitable
organizations in determining the boundaries of acceptable political activity.
The rules guiding charitable organizations are far too ineffective, in large part
because of their complexity and disorganization. Congress has previously
recognized this problem and has established objectives to improve the sanction
structures. The boundaries and the sanctions for exceeding those boundaries
can be greatly improved by legislation which meets the following Congressional
objectives:
82. Treasury has attempted to improve the coordination between the section 4911 definition of
lobbying and the section 4945 definition through recently issued final regulations. T.D. 8308, 1990-
2 C.B. 112. Treasury regulation section 53.4945-2(a)(1) states:
Under section 4945(d)(1) the term "taxable expenditure" includes any amount paid or
incurred by a private foundation to carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt, to
influence legislation. An expenditure is an attempt to influence legislation if it is for a
direct or grass roots lobbying communication, as defined in § 56.4911-2 (without
reference to §§ 56.4911-2(b)(3) and 56.4911-2(c)) and 56.4911-3.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1990). For a general discussion of the new proposed
regulations, see Troyer and Slocombe, New Prop. Regs. on Lobbying Ease Many Restrictions, J.
TAX'N, March, 1989, at 146 and McGovern, Accettura, and Skelly, The Final Lobbying Regulations:
A Challenge for Both the IRS and Charities, 48 TA NoTEs 1305 (September 3, 1990).
83. See Notice 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 392, as an example of how complexity can mislead the
unwary. Here, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to determine the applicability of sections
501(c)(3), 501(h), 4911, 4912, 4945(d)(1) and (2), and 4955 when a section 501(c)(3) organization
attempts to influence the Senate confirmation of an individual nominated by the President to serve
as a federal judge. The IRS correctly stated that such activity is not campaigning under sections
501(c)(3), 4955 or 4945(dX2). However, in determining whether or not such activity constitutes
lobbying under sections 501(c)(3), 501(h), 4911, 4912 and 4945(d)(1), the IRS completely fails to
recognize the differences in the lobbying definitions of the applicable code sections. The IRS decides
that "[blecause the Senate's action of advice and consent on a judicial nomination is an action with
respect to a resolution or similar item," the attempt is an attempt to "influence legislation" under
section 4911(e). This interpretation of section 4911(e) is at least plausible. However, the leap made
by the IRS from the applicability of section 4911(e) to the applicability of sections 501(c)(3), 501(h),
4912 and 4945(d)(1) is unjustifiable. "Accordingly, these activities are subject to the restrictions on
attempting to influence legislation contained in the code sections referred to above [sections 501(c)(3),
501(h), 4911, 4912 and 4945(d)(1)]." Notice 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 392.
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1. Simplification of the law;"
2. Matching the severity of the sanction with the severity of the offence;S
and,
3. Neutral application of the law."
Unfortunately, Congress has not yet transformed these objectives into legis-
lation.
A. Simplicity
A major problem with the current structure of sanctioning political activity
of charitable organizations is that there are as many definitions of political
activity as there are code sections restricting the activity.87 Although all of the
code sections dealing with political activity restrictions appear to be addressing
similar activities, there is no unified definition of the types of political activity
which are restricted. Both subtle and obvious differences in the definitions are
a primary source of unnecessary complexity and confusion. Although Congress
has perceived a problem with the multiple definitions and has asked the
Treasury to study the desirability of a unified standard for the measurement
of political activities of all charitable organizations, as yet no study results
and no legislative changes have been made.88
Not only are the definitions dealing with similar activities inconsistent, the
language employed by Congress in labelling the similar activities is confusing.
For example, what would be called campaigning in laymen's terms is referred
to in the Code as "participating or intervening in a political campaign"8 9 or
a "political expenditure." 90 What would be called lobbying in laymen's terms
is referred to as "carrying on propaganda," 91 "influencing legislation,"19 2 and
"lobbying expenditures. ' 93 "Taxable expenditure" is used to describe both
campaigning and lobbying,9 both considered to be political activities by the
layman.
Each code section defining a political activity has its own particular
sanction for discouraging the activity. For any one particular activity, therefore,
there may be multiple sanctions. Such a scheme of multiple sanctions may be
proper if the different code sections attempt to regulate distinct activities. The
84. H.R. Rm,. No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1628 (1987).
85. Id. at 1623-4.
86. Id. at 1625. See also Hearings, at 6 and 7 (Summary of statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs,
Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service).
87. Campaigning is defined in sections 501(c)(3), 527(e)(2), 4945(d)(2), 4955(d) and 162(e)(2)(A).
Direct lobbying is defined in sections 501(c)(3), 4911(d)(l)(B), 4912(d)(1), 4945(e)(2) and 162(e)(1).
Indirect or "grass roots" lobbying is defined in sections 501(c)(3), 491 l(d)(IXA), 4912(d)(1), 4945(e)(1),
and 162(e)(2)(B).
88. H.R. REP'. No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1628 (1987). Treasury has, however, published
final regulations which "ensure that the rules regarding lobbying by private foundations are consistent
with the rules regarding lobbying by electing public charities." T.D. 8308, 1990-2 C.B. 112. The
regulations, however, fall far short of developing a unified definition of lobbying. See supra note 82
and accompanying text.
89. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).
90. I.R.C. § 4955(d) (1991).
91. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).
92. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4911(d)(1)(B) (1991).
93. I.R.C. §§ 501(h) 4911 (1991).
94. I.R.C. § 4945(d)(2), (e)(2) (1991).
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sections dealing with the sanctioning of political activity, however, appear only
accidentally to regulate distinct activities. The definitions of political activities
are different, and therefore the activities regulated are different. Congress
could not possibly have intended to create a rational scheme to regulate subtle
differences in behavior through subtle differences in definitions. More likely,
the differences in definitions of similar political activities are the result of
haphazard, piecemeal legislation.
B. Matching Severity of Sanction with Severity of Offense
The severity of sanctions imposed on charitable organizations for their
political activities should correlate with the severity of the activity. 9" A small
political expenditure should not be as offensive to Congress as a large expen-
diture, and should, therefore, be taxed less severely than a large expenditure.
A large political expenditure should receive more severe penalties. The impo-
sition of multiple penalties for a single political behavior should be avoided
for the same reason. If multiple penalties are imposed, behaviors which are
similar in nature may be treated very differently. In effect, multiple penalties
create a suddenly higher rate of tax for behaviors that are not radically distinct
from behaviors that are subject to only one penalty.
Sanctions for campaign activity under current law include mandatory loss
of exempt status. Any campaigning activity, no matter how small, may invoke
this sanction." Obviously, the current rule for sanctioning campaign activity
falls far short of the Congressional matching objective. Complicating the
sanction structure even more, standards for applying the denial of tax exempt
status are ambiguous and subjective. 97 Charitable organizations may inadver-
tently exceed boundaries of acceptable behavior with disastrous results.
Taxation of political expenditures, with loss of exempt status only in the
case of an objectively defined excessive expenditure, would solve the problem
of unfairly enforced, or unenforced, penalties for minor offenses. Sections
501(h) and 4911 already achieve this goal with respect to the lobbying activities
of those organizations which elect to fall under the section 501(h) lobbying
standards. Expanding this type of expenditure structure to all section 501(c)(3)
organizations, and to campaigning as well as lobbying activities, would go far
95. H.R. REP. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) states:
Except in the case of private foundations, the only sanctions available at present with
respect to an organization which exceeds the limits on permitted lobbying are loss of
exempt status under section 501(c)(3) and loss of qualification to receive deductible
charitable contributions. Some organizations (particularly organizations which have
already built up substantial endowments) can split up their activities between a lobbying
organization and a charitable organization. For such organizations, these sanctions may
have little effect, and this lack of effect may tend to discourage enforcement effort.
For other organizations which cannot split up their activities between a lobbying
organization and a charitable organization and which must continue to rely upon the
receipt of deductible contributions to carry on their exempt purposes, loss of section
501(c)(3) status cannot be so easily compensated for and would constitute a severe blow
to the organization.
Id.
96. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).
97. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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in accomplishing the goal of matching the severity of the sanction with the
severity of the offense. The rates of tax applied to the expenditures and the
point at which tax exempt status is revoked can be set to suit Congressional
sentiment toward the type of charitable organization engaging in the activity
and toward the type of political behavior.
C. Neutral Application
Treasury enforcement discretion is perhaps the most dangerous aspect of
the current sanction structure. Congress has repeatedly expressed its concern
that the Treasury remain neutral in applying the political activity sanctions
against charitable organizations.9" The abuse of a subjective measure of political
activity by a partisan Treasury could greatly undermine public confidence in
the political system. The "substantial" standard now used to evaluate a large
portion of the lobbying activity of the nation's exempt organizations has the
potential to become just such a partisan tool. The "de minimis" exception to
campaigning activity could also severely damage the public's trust in a tax
system which is neutrally applied." The Congressional intent of a neutral
application of the law can be accomplished only by an objective political
expenditure standard.
III. PROPOSED SANCTION STRUCTURE: REPEALING THE
UNDERBRUSH
Improvement of the political activity sanction structure for charitable
organizations can be achieved by the enactment of the specific modifications
to the current law as set forth in the Appendix to this article. The proposal
reduces the number of penalties to two excise taxes, both using an objective
measure of political activity. One excise tax would control campaigning. The
other excise tax would control lobbying. The proposed taxes improve Treasury
neutrality and maintain a match between the severity of political activity and
the severity of the sanction. Under the proposal, an organization is subject to
the loss of its tax-exempt status only after making large or continuing political
expenditures.
98. H.R. REP. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7-17 (1976) and H.R. REp. No. 100-391, 100th
Cong., ist Sess. 1625 (1987). T.D. 8308, 1990-2 C.B. 112, states:
Before the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there was uncertainty about what
constituted a "substantial part" of an organization's activities. Congress was aware
both of the severity of loss of tax exemption as a sanction and of the belief that the
vague standard of the substantial part test tended to create uncertainty and allow
subjective and selective enforcement.
Id.
99. The Service has recognized the importance of a neutral appearance in the application of the
de minimis exception. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,267 (Feb. 20, 1970) states:
We are not indicating that the de minimis principle can or should be invoked in every
case where a number of organizations have engaged in substantially similar activities.
However, we do think that in a case where it is questionable whether more than a de
minimis amount of political activity has taken place, and where to revoke an exemption
would give the appearance of dissimilar treatment of organizations similarly situated,
the principle should be invoked.
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The maximum rate of tax on the expenditures and the level of expenditures
which cause a loss of exempt status under the proposal could be adjusted to
suit Congressional concerns. For example, in order to discourage large political
expenditures, Congress might desire to progressively increase the rates of tax
on both the lobbying and the campaigning excise taxes as the level of expen-
diture increased. Campaigning, historically considered the more undesirable
political activity of charitable organizations, could be taxed at a high maximum
rate and with a steep rate increase. A relatively small expenditure could also
trigger loss of exempt status. Less worrisome lobbying activity could be taxed
less severely.
The proposed simplification suggested in this article is itself intentionally
kept simple. The proposal uses as much of the existing sanction structure as
is possible while meeting the Congressional objectives discussed in Part II of
this article. The Code sections which are suggested as the basis of a new
sanction structure are chosen because they have to some degree withstood
Congressional scrutiny and been tested by the IRS and charitable organizations.
To say the least, the sections used in the proposal are familiar.
No doubt there will be objections to the particular code sections chosen
to guide charitable organizations in their political activities. Organizations once
free to test the murky waters of the "substantial part" restriction may dislike
the more objective standards proposed by this article.10° Congressmen opposed
to even a small amount of charitable organization involvement in campaigning
activities' 0 may object to an expenditure test, despite the benefits of greater
objectivity created by such a test. Nevertheless, the proposal as a whole better
satisfies Congressional objectives than does the status quo.
A. Campaigning Excise Tax
It is difficult to imagine a reasonable justification for the existence of
four different sanctions for campaigning activities which are closely similar.
100. Churches, made ineligible for the section 501(h) election at their own request, may especially
object to the proposed objective standard of the lobbying rules. The Joint Committee on Taxation,
"General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976," 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B. 427 (Vol. 2), at 427,
states:
Concerns have been expressed by a number of church groups that both prior law and
the rules in the Act might violate their constitutional rights under the First Amendment.
Such groups have indicated a concern that if a church were permitted to elect the new
rules, then the Internal Revenue Service might be influenced by this legislation even
though the church in fact did not elect.
As a result of the concerns expressed by a number of churches and in response to their
specific request, the Act does not permit a church or a convention or association of
churches (or an integrated auxiliary or a member of an affiliated group which includes
a church, etc.), to elect to come under these provisions.
Additionally, because they have been a primary beneficiary of the de minimis exception
to the prohibition on campaigning activity, churches may also fight the proposed
objective standard of the campaigning rules.
Gen. Couns. Men. 34,267 (Feb. 20, 1970); Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,071 (Mar. 11, 1969).
101. For a discussion of the legislative history reflecting Congressional concern over the involve-
ment by charitable organizations in campaigning activities, see Association of the Bar v. Commissioner,
858 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
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The discussion regarding the problems of the current sanction system'0 2 suggests
the need for a unified definition of campaigning activity and a matching of
the severity of sanctions with the severity of the offense. An obvious way to
accomplish this goal is to repeal the section 527(f) excise tax (as it applies to
charitable organizations)1 3 , the 4945 excise tax (as it applies to the campaigning
activity of private foundations)'" and the section 501(c)(3) prohibition on
campaigning activity. 05 What remains is a modified section 4955 excise tax
applicable as the sole sanction to campaigning by all charitable organizations.'06
The proposal retains the sanction of loss of exempt status for large or
continuous campaign expenditures by adding a new section 4955(e).'0 7 Under
102. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
103. Congress may desire to keep the section 527(f) tax for other tax exempt entities. Discussion
of this decision is outside the scope of this article.
104. The proposal eliminates the section 4945 excise tax on the campaigning activity of private
foundations in order to simplify the definitions of lobbying and campaigning. Under the proposal
private foundation activity would be governed by the same sections which govern other section
501(c)(3) organizations, primarily sections 4911 and 4955. If Congress were to decide that private
foundations needed more severe sanctions than other section 501(c)(3) organizations, the rates of tax
under sections 4911 and 4955 could be increased for private foundations. In this manner, the integrity
of the simplified definitions is maintained.
105. The repeal of the section 501(c)(3) prohibition on campaigning would not, of course, relieve
a section 501(c)(3) organization from the requirement that it be organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, etc. purposes and that no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual. Organizations operated for the benefit of a particular candidate
or a particular party still could not maintain a tax-exempt status. See American Campaign Academy
v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
106. Section 6852 (relating to termination assessments in case of flagrant political expenditures)
and section 7409 (relating to actions to enjoin flagrant political expenditures) are repealed in the
proposal because repeal would not substantially diminish the effectiveness of section 4955 and because
repeal would aid the effort to simplify sanctions for political activities of charitable organizations.
However, the IRS would likely oppose any reduction in their enforcement powers and Congress may
decide these sections are necessary tools to restrict campaigning activity. If Congress were to make
all other changes suggested in this proposal, but retain the section 6852 and section 7409 powers,
minor modifications to these sections would be required to take into account changes made in section
501(c)(3) and section 4955. For example, to be consistent with the proposed section 4955, "political"
expenditures would need to be changed to "campaign" expenditures. Also, because there is not an
absolute prohibition against campaigning under the proposal, the enforcement sections would need
to be made applicable only in severe cases. This modification could be achieved by defining "flagrant"
under sections 6852 and 7409 in terms of dollars expended in campaigning activity.
107. A similar plan was suggested by the Treasury to the Subcommittee on Oversight of the
House Ways and Means Committee during the 1987 hearings on lobbying and political activities of
tax exempt-organizations:
As previously stated, under current law the only sanction for engaging in political
activities is revocation of tax exempt status. Unlike the restriction on lobbying, the
prohibition on participation in political activities is absolute and thus does not raise
problems of measuring the level of the activity. Further, political activity is somewhat
easier to define than lobbying activity. Even though the standards are more precise than
with respect to the rules on lobbying, revocation of tax exempt status may still be
unduly harsh in some instances. In other cases, such as where an organization has
expended all its funds, it may have little or no impact on an organization.
The Treasury Department suggests that, in lieu of automatic revocation of exempt
status, the Subcommittee consider the imposition of an excise tax on public charities
that engage in political activities. Such a tax should be similar to the excise tax that is
imposed on private foundations under section 4945. Thus, a tax should be imposed
both on the organization and on the management of the organization if it acted with
knowledge that the expenditure was for political activities. Also, the statute should
require correction of the prohibited expenditure either by recovery of the money or by
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this new provision, the organization loses its exempt status if the average
campaign expenditure over any two year period exceeds $500.'0 8 The provision
is similar to the proposed section 501(h)(1) provision requiring loss of exempt
status if the average direct or grass roots lobbying expenditures exceeds the
appropriate ceiling amounts.'19 The proposed section 4955(e) sanction is in
addition to the tax under the proposed section 4955(a). This two step approach
to sanctions improves the matching of the severity of the penalty with the
severity of the offence." 0 The two year period and the $500 amount proposed
are arbitrary and may be adjusted by Congress to either loosen or tighten the
conditions for the loss of exempt status.
In order to discourage campaigning, the proposed section 4955 rate is
modified to equal the maximum individual tax rate under section 1. At this
maximum individual rate, there would be no net tax advantage to making a
deductible charitable contribution which would be used for campaign activity.
In other words, an individual taxpayer could buy the same dollars of campaign
activity by means of a direct contribution to a political campaign as the
taxpayer could buy through a tax-exempt conduit. The tax at the charitable
organization level should cause donors to be just as inclined to send the dollars
they intended to be used for campaigning activities directly to the political
campaigns as they are to send those dollars through a charitable organization.",
The proposed sanction for campaigning activity is based on expenditures.
It is easier for the IRS to locate an expenditure than it is for them to define
an activity; enforcement of an expenditure-based tax is more objective than
an activity-based sanction."12 However, the trade-off for increased objectivity
in enforcement is that the door would be open for charitable organizations to
become more involved in political campaigns than they have in the past. The
organizations would incur no campaign activity tax as long as the organization
makes no campaign expenditures. Endorsement, not involving expenditures, of
political candidates might become common. Unpaid volunteer campaigning
could also increase. This change to an expenditure-based standard, however,
would ameliorate the politically delicate problem of the challenge to the exempt
status of certain organizations which currently endorse candidates." 3
such other means as the Commissioner may prescribe. Absent correction of the expen-
diture, or in cases of repeated of flagrant violations, the organization should be subject
to loss of its exempt status.
Hearings, at 90 (Statement of J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the
Treasury).
108. The language of section 504 is modified to take into account the change in how an
organization loses its exempt status. The concept of preventing a shift from a section 501(c)(3)
organization to a section 501(c)(4) organization is unchanged. Note also that section 504(c) is deleted
in the proposal because proposed section 501(h) applies to all section 501(c)(3) organizations.
109. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
111. The tax at the exempt organization level is simply a way for Congress not to subsidize the
campaign activity of exempt organizations. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 544 (1983).
112. Hearings, at 6 (Summary of statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Jr., Commissioner, Internal
Revenue Service).
113. See, e.g., Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Treasury Secretary, 89-2 USTC 1 9576 (2nd
Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the campaigning activities of religious organizations, see generally
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B. Lobbying Excise Tax
Sections 501(h) and 4911 can be modified to accomplish all regulation of
charitable organization lobbying activity. These two code sections are already
in use on an elective basis.' 2 ' The proposal makes the modified sections 501(h)
and 4911 mandatory for all charitable organizations." Other code sections
currently regulating charitable organization lobbying activity are eliminated." 6
The proposal requires all charitable organizations to use an objective
expenditure standard for evaluating lobbying activities. Section 4912, imposing
a tax on disqualifying lobbying expenditures, and section 4945, imposing a tax
on private foundations which engage in lobbying activities, would be superflu-
ous and are suggested for repeal under the proposal." 7 As a result of the use
of the objective standard the problems relating to the definition and enforce-
ment of "substantial" lobbying would disappear. Charitable organizations and
the IRS would more easily know when an organization crossed over into
unfavorable territory." 8
Note, Religion and Political Campaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 29 FoDtAm L. Rav. 536 (1981).
114. See supra note 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how few organizations have
made the section 501(h) election.
115. Congress may see fit to raise the rate on the section 4911 tax in order to make substantial
lobbying even less desirable. If the rate exceeds the maximum individual tax rate then the Congressional
goal of ensuring "that no tax-deductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying" will
be met. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544, n.6 (1983).
116. The proposal eliminates the section 501(c)(3) lobbying language and all of sections 4912 and
4945.
117. In order to keep the limitations on lobbying by private foundations more restrictive than
the limitations on lobbying activity by other charitable organizations, Congress may decide that
private foundations need greater tax rates and smaller ceiling amounts than do the other charitable
organizations. This further restriction on private foundations could be accomplished within sections
501(h) and 4911. For purposes of simplicity, this change was not incorporated into the proposal.
By the elimination of section 4912 (and section 4945) the proposal removes all sanctions against
managers who knowingly exceed lobbying limitations. The proposed section 4911(a)(3), however,
remedies the problem by including a sanction against managers similar to that found in section
4955(a)(2).
118. The Treasury endorsed the objective expenditure standard for evaluating lobbying activities
in a statement to the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee:
As noted above, if a section 501(c)(3) organization does not elect to be subject to the
expenditure test, it is subject to loss of tax exempt status if it engages in substantial
lobbying activities. Because of the vagueness of the "substantial part" test, the test
provides little guidance to taxpayers and is difficult for the Service to administer. A
vague standard is particularly troublesome in this situation because the only available
sanction - revocation of the tax exempt status - is sometimes unduly harsh. Moreover,
the vagueness of the standard and the harshness of the sanction leave the Service open
to accusations of politically motivated enforcement.
The elective expenditure test under section 501(h) represents a significant improvement
over the substantial part test. Admittedly, an expenditure test is not necessarily the best
measure of the extent of an organization's lobbying activities in all cases. In addition,
even though the dollar amount of permissible lobbying is a precise standard, it must
be applied to an activity that is difficult to define and that raises difficult allocation
issues. However, while the expenditure test is not perfect from a theoretical standpoint
and is not entirely precise, on balance it represents a reasonable and objective measure
of lobbying activities.
The imposition of excise taxes on organizations that exceed the applicable limits under
the expenditure test, with revocation of exempt status reserved as a sanction for those
organizations that exceed the limits by a significant amount over the substantial part
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The proposal makes a minor change in section 501(h) by replacing "nor-
mally" with "on the average over four consecutive years." The phrase "for
each taxable year" is deleted in sections 501(h)(1)(A) and (B) in order to clarify
that the average of four years is the proper test and that any single year in
isolation is not significant in the computation of the four-year average. These
changes make a measurable standard for the denial of exempt status when an
organization consistently exceeds the lobbying or grass roots ceiling amounts.
The four-year standard has been informally applied by IRS in the past" 9; the
proposal merely codifies the standard so that IRS enforcement discretion is
minimized. 120
IV. CONCLUSION
The current system for controlling the political behavior of charitable
organizations does not work. The boundaries of acceptable political activity
are unclear. The penalties for exceeding the boundaries are complex and
inappropriate. Treasury enforcement of the laws is overly discretionary, allow-
ing for the perception, at least, of politically motivated discrimination. In such
a climate of uncertainty, regulation of political activity becomes ineffective
and unfair.
Congress can improve the current law by enacting the changes suggested
in this article. The proposed changes simplify the definitions of proscribed
lobbying and campaigning activity so that charitable organizations will know
which behavior is permitted and which behavior is penalized. The definitions
are made more objective in order to reduce the possibility of discrimination
in enforcement. The proposal modifies the penalty calculation so that the
penalties correspond to the severity of the sanctioned behavior. In this way,
the more egregious behavior is taxed more severely than the less egregious
behavior (i.e., larger political expenditures receive larger penalties). In sum-
mary, the proposal allows Congress to restrict the political activity of charitable
organizations in a way that achieves the Congressional goals of simplifying the




Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
test. The imposition of an excise tax is a more appropriate sanction for initial violations
and provides fair warning, prior to revocation of exempt status, to organizations that
are engaging in impermissible levels of lobbying activities.
Hearings, at 90 (Statement of J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the
Treasury).
119. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
120. Proposed regulation section 1.501(h)-3 handles the "normally" standard more severely that
the legislative history of section 501(h) suggests was intended by Congress. The proposal in this
article adheres to the four year standard discussed in H.R. REP. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-17
(1976) and S. REP. No. 938 (PART 2), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, n.3 (1976).
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safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no ubsantial part ef the
aetiities of Whieh is earryinf go propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influenee legislation, (exteept as otherwise provided in subseetion(h)), and whieb
does net partiipate in, of intervene in (ineluding the ptublishing Of distributing
4 statements), any pelitieal eampaign on behalf of (of in Eoppsition to) any
eandidate Ao public effiee.121
501(h)
(1) GENERAL RULE.-In the case of [any organization which is described
in subsection (c)(3)-]an erganization to whiek this subseetion applies, 2 2 ex-
emption from taxation under subsection (a) shall be denied because a substantial
part of the activities of such organization consists of carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, but only if such organization
[on the average over four consecutive years-]nor fi.ally 23
(A) makes lobbying expenditures in excess of the lobbying ceiling amount
for such organization for each tayable year, 12 4 or
(B) makes grass roots expenditures in excess of the grass roots ceiling
amount for such organization for eaeh taxable yeaf.'2
(2) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) LOBBYING EXPENDITURES.-The term "lobbying expenditures"
means expenditures for the purpose of influencing legislation (as defined in
section 4911 (d)).
(B) LOBBYING CEILING AMOUNT.-The lobbying ceiling amount for
any organization for any taxable year is 150 percent of the lobbying nontaxable
amount for such organization for such taxable year, determined under section
4911.
(C) GRASS ROOTS EXPENDITURES.-The term "grass roots expendi-
tures" means expenditures for the purpose of influencing legislation (as defined
in section 4911(d) without regard to paragraph (1)(B) thereof).
(D) GRASS ROOTS CEILING AMOUNT.-The grass roots ceiling amount
for any organization for any taxable year is 150 percent of the grass roots
nontaxable amount for such organization for such taxable year, determined
under section 4911.
(3) ORGANIZATIONS TO WWCGiH THI SUBSECTION APPLIES. T
subseetien shal apply to any organiZation whieh has eleeted (in swek manae
and at- ueh time as the Seretar-y may preseribe) to have the preyvisions e4 tis
subseetion apply to sueh organization and whieh, fer the taxable year whieh
inel-ides the date the eleetien is made, is deseribed in subseetion (0(3-) and -
(A) i-9 deseribed in paragraph (4), and
121. See supra notes 105, 116 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.





(B) is noGt a disqualified organization under paragraph (5).
(4) ORGANIZATIONS PERMITTED TO ELEGT TO 4A'VE T141S SUBSEC
TION APPLY. -An organization is deseribed in this paragraph if it is deseribed
in-
(A) seetion 70(b)f l)-)ri) (relating to educational institutions),
(B) seetion 4-0(bX4-X(A)Qlii) (relating to hospitals and medieal researek organ-
izations),
(C) seetion 4-70(b*I1)(A)(iv) (relating to organizations supporiting, goernien
schools),
"D seetien 44O(b)dX)A)(vi) (relating to organizations publiely supported by
ehar-itable eontributions),
(EB) seetion 509(a)(2) (relating to organfiZations publiely supported by admis-
sions, sakes, ew-) or
(F) seetion 509(a)(3) (relating toe organizations supporting eertain types of
pu ck sharities) emeept that for purposes of this subparagraph, seetion 509(a)
shall be applied without regard to the last sentenee of seetion-509(a).
(4S) DISQUALIFIE ORGANIZATIONS. For purposes of paragraph (3) an
organization is a disqualified organization if it- is-
(A) desen-ibed in seetion -70(bX41)(A)(i) (relating to-ehurehes),
(B) an integrated auxiliary of a ehureh or of a coiwention or association of
ehurehes, or
(C) a mnember of an affiliated group of organizations (within t-he meaning of
seetio n 4941(f)2)) i one or more members of sueh group is deseribed in
subparagraph (A or (R).
(6) IYEARS FOR WHICH ELEC-TION IS EFFECTIVE eleetion by an
organization under this subseetion shaU be effective for al taxable years oef
sH organization whieh
(A) end after the date the eleetion is mnade, and
(%) begin before the date the eleetion Is re*'oked by suek organization (under
regulations preseribed by the-Seeretary).
(7) NO EFFECT ON CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONS. With respeet to any
organization for a taxable year for whieh-
(A) sueh organization is a disqualified organization (within the mneaning of
paragraph (55), or
(B) an eleetion under this subseetion is not in effeet fGor sueh o ganization,
nothing in this subseetion of in seetion 4944 shall be onstr-ued to affeet the
interpretation of the phrase, 1-tno substantial part of the aeti44ties of whisk is
earrying of propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influenee legislation"
under subseetion (0(4).
(89) AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS.
For rules regarding affiliated organizations, see seetion 4911(f).126
504
(a) GENERAL RULE. - An organization which -
(1) was exempt (or was determined by the Secretary to be exempt) from
taxation under section 501(a) by reason of being an organization described in
section 501(c)(3), and
126. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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(2) is not an organization described in section 501(c)(3) -
(A) by reason of [section 501(h)] Oarr-ying oft gada, 6+ othfrwise
attempting o influenee legislation,12 or
(B) by reason of [section 4955(e)] partiipating in, of intervening in, any
politieal c.m:gn on behalf of (ef in opposition to) any eandidate fof pablie
offiee,128 shall not at any time thereafter be treated as an organization described
in section 501(c)(4).
(b) REGULATIONS TO PREVENT AVOIDANCE. - The Secretary shall
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent the
avoidance of subsection (a), including regulations relating to a direct or indirect
transfer of all or part of the assets of an organization to an organization
controlled (directly or indirectly) by the same person or persons who control
the transfer or organization.
(c) CHURCHES, ETC. - Subseetien (a) shall not apply to any .rganizatin
whieh is a disqualified oraniaai n within the meaning of seetien 50,(h)(5)
(r~elating Wo Ghaehes, ete-.) for the teable year immnediately preeeding the firs
taxable year for whieh seh organizatin is deseribed in paagraph (Q) of
subseetion (a).'29
527(f)(1)
IN GENERAL.-If an organization described in section 501(c) [(except an
organization described in section 501(c)(3)) 30 ] which is exempt from tax under
section 501(a) expends any amount during the taxable year directly (or through
another organization) for an exempt function (within the meaning of subsection
(e)(2)), then, not withstanding any other provision of law, there shall be
included in the gross income of such organization for the taxable year, and
shall be subject to tax under subsection (b) as if it constituted political
organization taxable income, an amount equal to the lesser of-
(A) the net investment income of such organization for the taxable year,
or
(B)the aggregate amount so expended during the taxable year for such an
exempt function.
4911(a)(2)
ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH THIS SECTION APPLIES.-This section
applies to any organization [described in section 501(c)(3) which is exempt
from tax under section 501(a)] with Fespeet to whieh an election under seetion
504(h)r(i)l (relating to lobbying espeadires by publie ehar-ities) is in effeet
for the taxable year' 31 .
4911(a)(3)
[ON THE MANAGEMENT.-There is hereby imposed on the agreement
of any organization manager to the making of any expenditure, knowing that
it is an excess lobbying expenditure, a tax equal to 5 percent of the amount
127. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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thereof, unless such agreement is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.
The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be paid by any organization manager
who agreed to the making of the expenditure. 32]
4911(e)(2)
[ORGANIZATION MANAGER.-The term "organization manager" has







(1) ON THE ORGANIZATION.-There is hereby imposed on each [cam-
paign] pelitiea1 36 expenditure by a section 501(c)(3) organization a tax equal
to [the highest rate of tax imposed on individuals under section 1] 4-0 pe-een1 37
of the amount thereof. The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be paid by
the organization.
(2) ON THE MANAGEMENT.-There is hereby imposed on the agreement
of any organization manager to the making of any expenditure, knowing that
it is a [campaign] political expenditure, a tax equal to 2 1/2 percent of the
amount thereof, unless such agreement is not willful and is due to reasonable
cause. The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be paid by any organization
manager who agreed to the making of the expenditure.
(b) ADDITIONAL TAXES.-
(1) ON THE ORGANIZATION.-In any case in which an initial tax is
imposed by subsection (a)(1) on a [campaign] pelitieal expenditure and such
expenditure is not corrected within the taxable period, there is hereby imposed
a tax equal to 100 percent of the amount of the expenditure. The tax imposed
by this paragraph shall be paid by the organization.
(2) ON THE MANAGEMENT.-In any case in which an additional tax is
imposed by paragraph (1), if an organization manager refused to agree to part
or all of the correction, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 50 percent of
the amount of the [campaign] pelitieal expenditure. The tax imposed by this
paragraph shall be paid by any organization manager who refused to agree to
part or all of the correction.
(c) SPECIAL RULES.-For purposes of subsections (a) and (b)-
(1) JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.-If more than 1 person is liable
under subsection (a)(2) or (b)(2) with respect to the making of a [campaign]
132. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 104, 116 and accompanying text.
136. A change in terminology is proposed because of the current confusion as discussed in supra
notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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pelitieal expenditure, all such persons shall be jointly and severally liable under
such subsection with respect to such expenditure.
(2) LIMIT FOR MANAGEMENT.-With respect to any 1 [campaign]
pelifieal expenditure, the maximum amount of the tax imposed by subsection
(a)(2) shall not exceed $5,000, and the maximum amount of the tax imposed
by subsection (b)(2) shall not exceed $10,000.
(d) [CAMPAIGN] POL.ITIAL EXPENDITURE.-For purposes of this section-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The term "[campaign] pelitieal expenditure" means
any amount paid or incurred by a section 501(c)(3) organization in any
participation in, or intervention in (including the publication or distribution
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.
(2) CERTAIN OTHER EXPENDITURES INCLUDED.-In the case of an
organization which is formed primarily for purposes of promoting the candi-
dacy (or prospective candidacy) of an individual for public office (or which is
effectively controlled by a candidate or prospective candidate and which is
availed of primarily for such purposes), the term "[campaign] pelitioal expen-
diture" includes any of the following amounts paid or incurred by the organ-
ization;
(A) Amounts paid or incurred to such individual for speeches or other
services.
(B) Travel expenses of such individual.
(C) Expenses of conducting polls, surveys, or other studies, or preparing
papers or other materials, for use by such individual.
(D) Expenses of advertising, publicity, and fundraising for such individual.
(E) Any other expense which has the primary effect of promoting public
recognition, or otherwise primarily accruing to the benefit, of such individual.
(e) [LOSS OF EXEMPT STATUS.- Exemption from taxation under
section 501(a) shall be denied any organization described in section 501(c)(3)
if such organization on the average over two consecutive years makes campaign
expenditures in excess of $500.138
COORDINATION WITH SECTION 4945-. f ta* is imposed der t-his
seetion wth fespeet to any pelitieal expeadit e, sah expenditue shat& net be
tseated as a taxable expenditur-e fef purpoess of seetieft 494-5.139
(f) OTHER DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(1) SECTION 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATION.-The term "section 501(c)(3)
organization" means any organization which (without regard to any [campaign]
pelitieal expenditure) would be described in section 501(c)(3) and exempt from
taxation under 501(a).
(2) ORGANIZATION MANAGER.-The term "organization manager"
means-
(A) any officer, director, or trustee of the organization (or individual
having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers, directors, or
trustees of the organization), and
138. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
139. Section 4945 is repealed under the proposal. See supra notes 104, 116 and accompanying
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(B) with respect to any expenditure, any employee of the organization
having authority or responsibility with respect to such expenditure.
(3) CORRECTION.-The terms "correction" and "correct" mean, with
respect to any [campaign] pelitieal expenditure, recovering part or all of the
expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, establishment of safeguards to
prevent future [campaign] pefitieal expenditures, and where full recovery is
not possible, such additional corrective action as is prescribed by the Secretary
by regulations.
(4) TAXABLE PERIOD.-The term "taxable period" means, with respect
to any [campaign] pelifieal expenditure, the period beginning with the date on
which the [campaign] peliieal expenditure occurs and ending on the earlier
of-
(A) the date of mailing a notice of deficiency under section 6212 with
respect to the tax imposed by subsection (a)(l), or





140. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
141. Id.
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